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Research Motive
Schumpeter emphasized ( 1943) that those who are starting “new 
things”, or innovating need to be provided with “profits for above 
what are necessary in order to introduce the corresponding 
investment” He argued that entrepreneurial profits (or quasi-rents) 
may some time be provided by the difficulty of imitating the new 
technology (or organization), but sometimes would have to be 
secured through “restraints of trade” like cartel arrangements. The 
thrust of Schumpeter’s argument is then that entry barriers of one 
form or another are necessary to provide incentives for innovation 
because it means doing “new thins”. 
While, Chang H. J. (1993) is of this opinion that establishing an industry 
in a developing country may not involve doing anything “new” 
from a global point of view, but poses a similar incentive problem, 
because it still is a “new thing” for that nation. 
Therefore this study probes Korean industrial Strategy from a Distinct 
angle of financial system and financial sector policies as an imperative 
determinant of technological catching-up. 
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Corporate Diversification: Why firms diversify their product 
portfolio?
Gort (1962) defined diversification in terms of the concept of 'heterogeneity 
of output' based on the number of markets served by that output. 
To Berry (1975) diversification represents an increase in the number of 
industries in which firms are active. 
Hopkins (1985) defined diversification as the extent to which firms operate 
in different businesses simultaneously. 
Ansoff 's (1957, 1965) notion of variety emphasizes the entry of the firms 
into new markets with new products.
Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (1985) defined diversification as a means of 
spreading the base of the business to achieve improved growth and / or 
reduce overall risk.
Bailey and Friedlanender( 1982)Concerning economic performance, major 
rational for diversification is economies of scope.
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While most recent attempts at defining variety or diversification have roots in 
Neo- Schumpeterian Economics. 
It is defined as 'the number of actors, activities, and objects necessary to 
characterize the economic system'. Hence it represents qualitative change in 
the composition of an economic system.(Saviotti P.P. 2001)
Few empirical studies [Frenken et al (2007), Savoitti , Franken (2008), Hidalog et al 
(2007), Michael Funke and Ralf Ruhwedel (2001 and 2001 b)] confirm that 
producing highly differentiated export goods gives a competitive advantage 
which allows selling more products in international market. Because the 
marginal utility of adding a new good to the pre-existing pattern of 
consumption is greater than that of adding an extra unit of a pre-existing 
good ( Savoitti p p).
For the purpose of this study variety/ product Diversification is defined as, the 
degree of differentiation of industrial output of an economic system at higher 
level of aggregation.
In the broader sense variety can be subdivided into two categories.
1) Related Product Variety        2) Unrelated Product Variety
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Corporate Diversification and Export led 
Technological Catching-up in Korea.
The diversified business groups “Chaebol “ are found in South-Korea like Japan, 
India, Taiwan, Brazil, Turkey, and other late industrializing countries.
1) Japanese Colonialization
2) Origin of Diversified Corporate Groups in Korea ( 1953-58)
During this period political connections lead to uneven distribution of wealth, 
major industries to which these enterprises thriving on venality included 
textiles, paper, housing, mining, fertilizers, flour, alcohol, glass, pottery, 
livestock, construction, warehousing, and Trade. These subsidised 
entrepreneurs were generalists, devoted to money making in whatever 
industry the opportunity arose. 
( Government Audit report 1961, A. H. Amsden) 
3) Park C. H’s Control over Banks through Nationalization ( 1961)
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Economic Growth ,Technological Catching-up and 
Corporate Diversification in South-Korea
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Korean Chaebols in related & unrelated business 
activities to realize perceived profits
From 1981 to 1986 there were 1,136 reported cases of Chaebol beginning to 
own new businesses. Among these the number of horizontal integrations 
(intra-industry) was 324 (28.5% of the total), that of vertical integrations 
was 215(19.9% of the total), and that of diversifications into other industries 
(inter-industry) was 597 (52.6% of the total). The methods of expansion 
included acquiring stocks, establishing new companies, mergers, acquiring 
management participation, and acquiring business rights.
According to A. H Amsden, Korea’s business groups may have diversified widely 
because they had no technical expertise to build upon in related products or 
in higher quality product niches. Their widely diversified structures 
complemented their strategy to compete at the bottom end of many 
markets. In their diversification efforts, they had the full support of the 
government because the government’s vision of industrialization was fixated 
on bigness, and bigness and diversification overlaps.
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Corporate Diversification of 10 Largest Business 
Groups in Korea
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Degree of Unrelated Diversification of Chaebols
The leading Korean Chaebols comprise major divisions that have no relation to one 
another whatsoever: e.g.
1) Consumer electronics and petrochemicals in the case of  Lucky Goldstar.
2) Finance, construction, cement manufacturing, shipbuilding, shipping, steel 
structures and heavy machinery in the case of Hyundai.
3) Consumer electronics, heavy machinery, finance, broadcasting, a daily 
newspaper, and entertainment in the case of Samsung. 
4) Tourism industry business, an airline, a bus line, and a travel agency in the case of 
The Hanjin group. 
5) The KIA group makes vans and the machine tools that are used in their 
manufacture. 
6)The Doosan group makes bottling equipment and owns a bottling franchise.
Continuity in ownership and control contributed to a uniform group 
culture and a centralized knowledge of group resources. Both facilitated 
the intra-group transfer of money and personnel. Therefore an 
economy of scope arose in the form of the capability to diversify.
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Financial System & Korean Industrial Strategy.
During the 1960s to the 1980s, Korean commercial banks were controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance, and interest rates were regulated and policy loans were 
often directed towards specific, mostly export-related, industries. Even 
currently, a few types of financial incentives, such as export insurance, are 
still being used for the purpose of export promotion.
1) Policy Loans: Government control of interest rates provided the strategic 
industries with preferential access to capital at substantially subsidized interest 
rates. During the 1970s, preferential loans increased from less than 40 
percent of total bank lending in 1971 to over 55 percent during 1976-77 and 
almost 70 percent in 1978. 
Real interest rates of such policy loans were, in general, negative during the 
1970s, although they remained positive during the 1980s and the 1990s. As a 
result of the HCI Drive in the 1970s, the HCI sector not only had better 
access to capital, but also faced much lower average borrowing costs i.e. 
36% lower as compared to other sectors.
Similarly, Export industries also enjoyed preferential access to capital.  Their 
average borrowing cost was in general lower than that of other industries, 
from the 1970s to the 1990s, except for few years.
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2) Export Finance
Exporters received enormous interest rate subsidies from the 1960s to the 1980s, 
For instance, during 1966-1972; the interest rate for export finances was 17 
percent lower on average than the general lending rate. In 1985, to increase 
the production capacity of export industries, the government announced 
they would lend as much as necessary for expanding the production 
capacities of export industries. The average interest rate applicable to export 
finance was five percent during 1995-1997 and three percent during 1998-
1999, which was lower than the market average lending rate of 9-19 percent 
in 1995 and 8.5--20 percent in 1999.
The Korea Export-Import Bank, which has been funded by the government, has 
lent exporting firms up to 90 percent of the contracted value of exports. 
Later in 2002, the government introduced the Act for the Export-Import 
Bank of Korea, which enabled it to undertake risks that commercial banks 
were reluctant to assume. 
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3) Export Insurances
The Export Insurance Fund was established to support those export insurance 
programmes which were running on behalf of the government through the 
Korea Fire Re-Insurance Corporation during 1969--1976 and then Korea 
Export-Import Bank for 1977-1992. Foreign Investment Insurance was 
added in 1972 to insure against losses due to political risks accompanying 
foreign direct investment outflows. During 1968-1972, the value of exports 
supported by export insurance, i.e. the utilization ratio of export insurance, 
was as low as 0.8 percent. It remained approximately 3.0 percent during 
the 1980s.
Since 1980’s the government began emphasizing on indirect export 
subsidization, because direct export subsidization was  prohibited as a result 
of the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
The KEIC, Korea Export Insurance Corporation, was established by the 
government in 1992 as the exclusive export insurance provider in Korea, 
replacing the Korea Export-Import Bank. Afterwards Korea emerged as on 
of the heaviest users of the export insurance System.
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Utilization of Export Insurance and Loss Ratios in 
Korea, 1969-2003
The Export Insurance Act 
requires the Export Insurance 
Fund to finance the insurance 
programmes if the KEIC incurs 
budget deficits, adding 
financial security to the export 
insurance system.
The government has 
contributed as much as 
equivalent to US$ 2 billion, 
during 1969—2002 to the 
Export Insurance Fund.
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4) Corporate Procurement Loans Scheme
In Korea, business firms had large use of commercial bills for the settlement of 
commercial transactions. This practice, however, caused problems because 
SMEs, which had received commercial bills, had to wait for a considerable 
time before they could obtain cash settlement in full, aggravating their 
financial burden. The default of a company that had issued commercial bills 
ran the risk of causing a chain of defaults by those companies having received 
or accepted them.
Therefore, The Bank of Korea introduced the corporate procurement loans 
scheme in May 2000. Which is a new procedure for the settlement of 
commercial transactions under which corporations purchasing goods borrow 
settlement funds from banks, paying the suppliers in cash rather than 
commercial bills.
The scheme was swiftly established and the outstanding balance of loans 
extended under the this scheme surged from 65 billion won at the end of 
June 2000 to 3.3 trillion won at the end of December 2000. While the 
number of corporate beneficiaries of the scheme also soared from 135 to 
5,458 during the same period.
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5) Corporate Financial Gurantee System
The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF) and The Korea Technology Credit 
Guarantee Fund (KTCGF) were established in 1976 and in 1989, respectively, 
to increase the availability of loans for the establishment, expansion and 
improvement of business. KCGF and KTCGF provide lenders with a 
guarantee against losses incurred on loans. This support to lenders helps firms 
that do not have the tangible collateral to obtain debt financing. They 
provide guarantees for bank loans, bonds, commercial bills and leasing.
The government contributed $2 billion consisting of loans from ADB and the 
World Bank to KCGF and KTCGF in order to enlarge loan guarantees to 
SMEs and venture businesses. The outstanding balance of credit guarantees 
extended by these funds surged from 4,105.5 billion won at the end of 1989 
to 31,496.7 billion won at the end of June 2000. 
Corporate Loan Guarantee, top 30 Korean Chaebols
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Characteristics of corporate Loan guarantee institutions in 
Asian Countries
Rational for guarantees
Without the government’s implicit 
support for financially distressed firms 
and banks, the guarantor firms would 
face weaker incentives to engage in 
loan guarantee contracts and the banks 
would not trust loan guarantees made 
by a weak guarantor firm. The govt. 
therefore acted as an additional 
element affecting the credibility and 
hence the endorsement of a loan 
guarantee.
The importance of these institutions
in the economy and financial system can 
be gauged by the ratio of loan 
guarantees outstanding to GDP i.e. 
above 5% of GDP in case of Korea
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Financial Crisis 1997 – Blessing in disguise
As for as cause analysis is concerned financial market liberalization that was 
pursued throughout the mid-1990s, weak risk management system of Korean 
Banking Industry, continued erosion of the Korean economy’s international 
competitiveness, massive capital outflow, denied rollover of short-term 
external debt , Heavy corporate debt leverage, large amount of non 
performing loans of Chaebols, domestic wage hikes, the appreciation of the 
Korean won, and Southeast Asian Currency crisis are considered to be the 
main reasons of Korean Financial crisis of 1997. 
Bottlenecks appeared in the old methods and system of Korea which has yielded 
a lot in its development phase. Therefore Government took the advantage 
of these crisis and reformed the economy on massive scale on the following 
axis. 
1) Transformation of Korea into a market oriented economy
2) Improvement in the institutional regime
3) Transition to knowledge based economy
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Korean Government & Non performing Loans
The Korea Asset Management 
Corporation was set up in 
December 1997 which has 
settled NPLs worth 35 trillion 
won (US$32.1 billion) and 
recovered 18 trillion won 
(US$16.2 billion). Further, the 
government initially decided to 
provide 64 trillion won 
(US$57.6 billion) in public 
funds, but made fresh 
allocations, so far pumping 
89.6 trillion won (US$107.7 
billion) in public funds into the 
banks and non-banking 
financial institutions.
Public Fund Injected  1997- 2007
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South Korea achieved positive results through powerful government 
intervention and initiatives as there was no other effective option to solve 
NPLs problem. Therefore the NPL ratio reduced up to 0.67% as on end of 
June 2007 which is not even below to the average among US commercial 
banks (0.87% as on end of June 2007) but also well below the 
corresponding figure for the world’s largest (top 30 banks in terms of core 
capital) banks.
Non Performing Loans of Commercial Banks
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6) Government Venture Capital Funds
Korea after the financial crisis of 1997-98 made an effort to reduce the influence 
of the chaebol by augmenting the role of technology oriented small firms. 
The government jump-started the venture capital market in 1998 through 
direct infusion of equity capital. Certain small firms were designated “venture 
businesses” which are eligible for investments from venture capital firms 
(VCFs) and limited partnerships funds (LPFs), both are funded largely by the 
government and the chaebols.
Korea now ranks among the leading OECD countries in venture capital 
investment as a share of GDP and third in the share of venture capital being 
channelled to start-up enterprises (after the United States and Canada)
1) Limited partnership funds (LPFs)
2) The Informatization Promotion Fund (IPF)
3) The Cultural Industry Promotion Fund (CIPF)
4) The Film Promotion Fund (FPF)
5) The Science and Technology Fund (STF)
6) The Small and Medium Business Fund (SMBF)
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7) KOSDAQ; Second-tier stock markets
In 1996, the Korean government established the Korea Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ) stock market to promote access of high-
technology start-ups to equity funding, naming it after the NASDAQ in the 
United States.Listing on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) was available only 
to well-established companies. The KOSDAQ has easier entry requirements 
and lighter continuing obligations compared with the KSE. Standard 
requirements for paid-in capital, level of assets, business performance and 
debt-to-equity ratio are not applied to venture businesses. In 2002, the 
government revised the Special Measures Law for Fostering Venture 
Businesses to enhance exit procedures for venture-backed firms
Due to growth in 1998-2000 linked to the worldwide technology boom, the 
number of listed companies on the KOSDAQ more than doubled from 359 
to 721, of which nearly half were venture businesses accounting for more 
than 70% of daily trading (by market value) As per 19 February 2008, 1029 
companies are listed on KOSDAQ for trading. The number of listed 
companies in Korea is far less than on the NASDAQ but higher than in many 
European countries including the United Kingdom.
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An Imitator to innovator; Transformation of Korea 
into Knowledge Economy
The  Acquisition  of  Technological   Capability through 
formal & Informal Modes
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Government and R&D Investment in Korea
Korean firms predominantly Chaebols, have 
transformed themselves from mere imitators 
of mature technologies to competitor in 
some of cutting edge technologies just in 
three decades.
Expenditure on R&D Activities in Korea
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KAM Basic Scorecard for Korea, East Asia 
& High Income Country Av. Number of KPO Patents Granted
No. of US patents granted to Koreans
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Corporate Diversification (Related & mostly Unrelated)
R&D Investment,University Industry     
and Research Institutes
An Economy of Scope arosed in the form of the capability to diversify
Initial Competition at bottom end 
of many markets
Exports Earnings + Learning
Import of TechnologyTechnological 








Technological change, Innovation and uncertainty are inseparably connected 
therefore national technological development calls for soft-financial 
intermediation. So, it depends on the financial system that how much 
flexible, robust, risk mitigating and bearing it is. Greater the risk bearing 
appetite of a financial system, (actual or managed i.e government guarantees 
or easy access to finance) larger will be the numbers of entrepreneurs who 
will expose themselves to innovations and risks, so higher will be the 
corporate diversification that will give birth to the variety of products to be 
produced which will ensure more exports because “the utility of adding a 
new good to the pre-existing pattern of consumption is greater than that of 
adding an extra unit of a pre-existing good”. 
As in this context Christensen J.L. also reiterates, “if the firm or the country were 
to focus all efforts on allocating existing resources in a better way, and if 
every single unit kept producing the same products with the same techniques, 
it would not only stagnate. It would gradually become increasingly poor 
because its products would become less and less in demand.Therefore, when 
the focus is on economic development , successful innovation is more 
important than efficient allocation.
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